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ABSTRACT
Computer systems have proven to be essential to achieving our daily tasks such as managing
our banking accounts, managing our health information and managing critical information sys-
tems such as drinking water systems or nuclear power plant systems. Such distributed systems
are networked and must be protected against cyber threats. This research presents the design
and implementation of a stand alone web based biometric keystroke authentication framework
that creates a user’s keystroke typing profile and use it as a second form of authentication. Sev-
eral biometric models were then bench marked for their accuracy by computing their EER. By
using keystroke biometrics as a second form of authentication the overall system’s security is
enhanced without the need of extra peripheral devices and without interrupting a user’s work-
flow.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
This research was part of an interdisciplinary collaboration between The University of Ver-
mont Mechanical, Electrical and Biomedical Engineering Departments and the University of
Tennessee (UTC) Computer Science and Engineering department. UTC was responsible for
creating a secure computing environment to enable a GPR operator to offload their collected
scans to a data analysis platform that would then be further processed to create underground
maps of the underground infrastructure. As a result of higher usage of mobile devices, the de-
velopment of web applications has also increased; most web applications follow a client-server
model in which the client and server communicate over a shared channel. This research fo-
cused on two areas. First, we developed a secure client-server web application that facilitates
city planning by mapping out underground infrastructure and secondly, we developed a stan-
dalone framework for second factor authentication using biometric keystrokes. Much of the
literature on critical infrastructure (CI) systems security research focuses on industrial control
systems (ICS) and not on distributed systems accessible via the Internet. Because a system can
be accessed via the Internet, it is necessary that the system maintain data confidentiality, data
integrity, and the availability of resource(s) to its users. Such a system is exposed to web crawler
bots and has a potential to be compromised by malicious entities. Network data confidentiality
and data integrity can be compromised as it is routed to the next network hop. Assume that
there exists a rogue network administrator on at least one of the following network hops and
that they are able to capture all network packets: the local area network (LAN), internet service
provider and the domain name service (DNS). Designing a secure CI web based application can
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be challenging as there are many components in the system each containing different operating
systems and different hardware specifications.
A disruption to any CI system should be prevented at all cost as it may cause drastic effects
to the power grid, financial sectors and other CI; which is why all CI be carefully designed to
minimize the effect of a disruption to the end user. Combining keystroke biometric authentica-
tion, a secure network design, and a cyber risk management plan can prevent and or mitigate
cyber risks to the system.
We utilize authentication in our everyday tasks to verify our identity before being allowed
access to: our online bank accounts, online medical records and other sensitive data that are
electronically stored. Forouzan defines authentication as “a security service that checks the
identity of the party at the other end of the line” [3]. Coupling other forms of authentication
into the principle form of authentication has proven to enhance the system’s security because
a second authentication form can mitigate the compromise of the first form of authentication.
User authentication is categorized into three unique factors: knowledge factors, physical pos-
session factors and biological inherent factors [4]. Table 1.1 outlines the three authentication
factors along with a descriptions and examples of each factor.
Table 1.1
The Three Authentication Factors
Authentication Factor Description Examples
Knowledge Factors Something a user knows username &password,
passphrase, PIN
Possession Factors Something a user physically
possesses
hardware keys, ID card, smart
phone software
Biological Factors Something inherent to a user
something
iris, fingerprint, and behavioral
characteristics: gait, typing
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Our research focused on utilizing user keystroke biometrics to add second factor authen-
tication to a system. Keystroke biometrics involves collecting a user’s keystrokes and then
extracting a typing behavior template from their keystrokes. There are several types of user
biometrics as mentioned in table 1.1, each with their own downfalls and benefits which must
be considered in the design of an authentication system. For example consider the available
hardware on a mobile system such as a finger print scanner, front facing camera and a software
keyboard and how you can use the available hardware for authentication. First the finger print
scanner can allow a user to authenticate with a biometric fingerprint, secondly, the user can use
the front facing camera to authenticate with their face or iris via biometric and lastly, the user
can authenticate with the keyboard by: entering their username and password and using their
biometric keystrokes. Overall, the available hardware on a computing device will influence the
type(s) of authentication that a system can use without having to add on extra hardware. This
is the motivation behind using keystroke biometrics as most computing systems already have a
keyboard and no extra peripherals or other hardware needs to be integrated into the system.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Typically, when accessing a resource on the Internet you will have to enter your log in cre-
dentials such as your user name and password before being granted access to the resources. Un-
fortunately, a user’s login credentials may get compromised due to a weakness in the system’s
web-based software, the credentials may be shared with other unauthorized users, or stolen cre-
dentials via phishing methods. With respect to an authentication knowledge factor the problem
can be stated as: how can we mitigate the use of a compromised user password or mitigate the
use of a shared password? User biometrics are unique to an individual and have been coupled
with other forms of authentication to provide another layer of authentication and thus strengthen
the overall authentication. Keystroke biometric authentication involves using machine learning
techniques such as metric distances to compare keystroke similarities, statistical models, neural
network models to classify one user from another.
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1.3 Objectives of the Study
The research goals were to provide: a stand alone web-based biometric keystroke authenti-
cation as a second factor, provide an encrypted high speed data channel, and to manage cyber
risks using a well established cyber security framework policy.
We took advantage of the readily available low latent high speed gigabit fiber Internet con-
nection in Chattanooga, TN.A high throughput network was essential to our design because we
needed to upload large files (at least a gigabyte in size) to the data processing server.
In summary, our research goals were to: develop a highly secure web-based system, in
which multiple users can upload and access sensitive data, manage cyber risks to the system
and create a standalone biometric keystroke authentication framework.
1.3.1 Cybersecurity Risk Management
In 2013, executive order 13536 was issued to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience.
This executive order also called for a cybersecurity framework to outline and guide an organiza-
tion in managing cybersecurity risks in CI. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) in partnership with industry developed a cyber security framework to guide organiza-
tions in cybersecurity processes and to manage cybersecurity risk processes in CI systems [2].
The framework prepares an organization to administer best practices of risk management. Fur-
thermore, since each organization operates uniquely the framework is meant to supplement an
organization’s current risk management plan. The framework is general enough to be used
internationally because it references internationally recognized cybersecurity standards [2].
In 1.1 we see that there are five functions in this framework: Identify, Protect, Detect, Re-
spond and Recover. Initially the NIST Cybersecurity framework was developed for CI but as
of May 2017, the framework is required to be used in all U.S. federal government information
systems [5]. Because our system collected sensitive data, the framework provided motivation
in designing a resilient and secure system.
4
Figure 1.1
NIST Cyber Security Framework [2]
1.4 Scope and Limitation of the Study
This research presents two areas of information security and information assurance: cyber secu-
rity risk management and biometric keystroke authentication. After securely collecting the data
a user will need to access it via a web-based application. Before a user can access the system’s
sensitive data they must register their username and password credentials to a database and then
enroll their biometric keystrokes with the system.
To minimize cyber risks, our system also considered risk management as part of the secu-
rity architecture. The web-based application is a client-server system in which the client and
server communicate over a secure shell (SSH) channel as well as over a TLS connection. The
scope of our research is to provide a stand alone multi user web-based keystroke authentication
application that uses a keyboard to capture a user’s keystrokes profile for use as a second factor
authentication. By stand alone, we mean that the authentication system can be integrated into
most web based applications. Second-factor means that in addition to using a knowledge factor
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we will also use a keystroke biometric factor to authenticate a user. In our research we make the
assumption that the keystroke biometric system is being utilized across a standard uniform set of
keyboards, meaning that the keyboard is the same for all users. This is an important assumption
as a keyboard’s hardware can cause the keystroke timing measurements to be inconsistent.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Recently, machine learning methods have been utilized to improve sequence models in natu-
ral language processing (NLP) such as: machine translation, speech recognition and sentiment
classification. Our contribution to keystroke biometrics is evaluating an attention-based neural
network (NN) model and comparing it’s accuracy to other NNmodels that are used in keystroke
biometrics.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATEDWORK
2.1 Biometric Keystroke Authentication
Biometrics have proven useful in asserting an individual’s identity because they are consid-
ered unique to an individual. Biometrics involves using biological measurements and calcu-
lations to [6]. An individual’s identity can be proven in three ways: something they know,
something they poses and something they are (biometrics); the strongest form of authentication
uses a combination of all three. Biometrics can also be categorized into two types: 1. Physical
biometrics (static) and 2. Behavioral biometrics (dynamic). Our research will focus on a user’s
keystroke typing behavior. Examples of physical biometrics include retina or iris analysis and
fingerprint analysis. Examples of behavioral biometrics include: gait analysis, keystroke anal-
ysis and voice analysis. Table 2.1 outlines several biometric criteria a biological measurement
should meet according to Mustafić et al [6].
Analyzing a user’s keystrokes to classify them as an impostor user or legitimate user has
proven to be a reliable behavioral biometric [7], [8], [9]. A couple of motives for researching
keystroke authentication are: it can provide a more user friendly and secure user authentication
mechanism and it does not require any new hardware, as a keyboard is already present on a
user’s workstation. Keystroke dynamics are categorized a type of biometric authentication.
Killourhy et al. and Forsen et al. were one of the first to research a person’s typing patterns and
apply it in automatic authentication [10]. They have open-sourced their keystroke dataset and it
their dataset is widely used in keystroke biometric research. SinceKillourhy et al published their
dataset, the field of keystroke dynamics has evolved to using different analytic methods such as:
distance metrics to using machine learning models such as recurrent neural networks (RNN),
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Table 2.1
Biometric Criteria
Requirement Description
Acceptability Biometric characteristic is accepted by users.
Circumvention Biometric characteristic is impostor proof.
Collectability Biometric characteristic can be measured quantitatively via detectors.
Distinctive Biometric characteristic is unique for each individual.
Performance Biometric feature collection can be achieved with a desired recognition
accuracy and speed.
Permanence Biometric characteristic is immutable.
Universality All individuals possess the biometric characteristic.
support vector machines (SVN), Gaussianmixture models with the universal backgroundmodel
(GMM-UBM), etc. [7].
2.2 Language Models in Keystroke Biometrics
We will now explain several mathematical concepts of the NLPmodels relevant to keystroke
biometrics as they form a foundation for our research specifically the attention based neural
network model. According to Mohammadi et al. “Language models compute the probability
of a number of words in a particular sequence” [11]. Due to the probabilistic relationship be-
tween the timing of inter-keystroke sequences, language model computations can be applied to
learn the probabilistic timing dependency of sequence of keystrokes. The following equation
describes a keystroke sequence element Yt at time step t .
Yt = f(Yt−1) (2.1)
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Where function f maps the previous keystroke element of the keystroke sequence to the next
keystroke element in the keystroke sequence. In the context of s2s f represents a neural network
which predicts the next keystroke element given the current keystroke element at time-step t−1.
Equation (2.1) can be rewritten as
yˆ = softmax(W (2)tanh(W (1)x+ b(1)) +W (3)x+ b(3)) (2.2)
Where the softmax function represents the neural network’s hidden layers and the linear func-
tionW (3)x+ b(3) represents all of the previous n input keystrokes.
2.3 RNNs
Research has shown that RNNs perform efficiently on sequential [8], [12], [13]. Due their
efficiency in sequential analysis RNNs are utilized in text to speech translation, language text
to text translation, voice recognition and keystroke analysis.
According to Mohammadi et. al. the neural network’s parameter’s details are [11]:
ht = σ(W
(hh)ht−1 +W (hx)x[t]) (2.3)
yˆ = softmax(W (S)ht) (2.4)
Where the softmax function
• x1, ..., xt−1, xt, xt+1, ..., xT : the word vectors representing a word collection (word cor-
pus) of T words.
• ht = σ(W (hh)ht−1 +W (hx)x[t]): this computes the hidden layer output features at each
time step t.
– xt ∈ Rd: Represents the word input vector at time t.
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– W hx ∈ RDh×d: Weights matrix used to train the input word vector xt.
– W hh ∈ RDh×Dh: Weights matrix to used to train the output of the previous time-
step, ht−1.
– ht−1 ∈ RDh: Output of the non-linear function at the previous time step t− 1.
– σ() = 1
1+e−x : The sigmoid function (non-linear function) used as the activation
function of artificial neurons.
• yˆt = p(t|h) = softmax(W (S)ht) = eWth∑K
j=1 e
Wjh
: The normalized probability distribution
over the vocabulary at time-step t. yˆt is the next predicted word.
The loss function:
J (t)(θ) = −
|V |∑
j=1
yt,j × log(yˆt,j) (2.5)
The cross entropy error over a corpus of size T is:
J = − 1
T
T∑
t=1
J (t)(θ) (2.6)
Sequence to sequence (s2s) involves mapping (encoding) an input sequence (characters, num-
bers, words, etc) to a predicted answer (output). Keystroke biometrics, leverages sequence to
sequence (s2s) modeling, because the input sequence of keystroke metric features (DU, UD,
and DD) can be encoded to produce an output sequence of timestamps. This keystroke s2s can
be learned by a model and then be used to learn a user’s keystroke behavior. To efficiently
perform this type of analysis, one can leverage data and task parallelism to speed up the train-
ing process. It should be noted that the computing system should have sufficient memory to
perform the s2s analysis on large datasets. Previous works [8], [9] studied user’s keystroke in-
puts such as: the time duration of a key presses to subsequent key presses, the time period of
when a key is released from key to key, the period that a key is held down and other subsequent
keystroke timing metrics. Karim et al., implemented five authentication algorithms for use in
keystroke dynamics, two distance based and two were matching-ratio based with the last one
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being order based [9]. Other researchers [8] have taken the RNN approach and implemented
a long short term memory (LSTM) which is a specialized type of RNN. Current research has
explored approaches to shorten the training time of long sequences of input data, by paralleliz-
ing computations on graphical processing units (GPUs). In [14], Vaswani et al. developed a
novel attention based neural network architecture model called the Transformer network, this
type of network is an attention based neural network (NN). In the context of natural machine
translation, Vaswani and his research group proved that their attention based Transformer net-
work was highly paralellizable and reduced the training time of machine translation compared
to RNN based models [14]. In the respective following sections, we will outline the LSTM and
Attention network architectures.
2.4 LSTMs
Long short term memories (LSTMs) were developed to address the problem of capturing
long-term dependencies by solving the vanishing gradient in learning an input sequence. The
LSTM network works by storing and updating the relevant data into memory cells by using
gates. Note, the gates are all sigmoid functions as seen in section 2.3. LSTMs have added gated
activation functions compared to the generalized RNN. Below are the mathematical formulas
used in the LSTM architecture:
it = σ(W
(i)xt + U
(i)ht−1) (Input gate)
ft = σ(W
(f)xt + U
(f)ht−1) (Forget gate)
ot = σ(W
(o)xt + U
(o)ht−1) (Output/Exposure gate)
c˜t = tanh(W
(c)xt + U
(c)ht−1) (New memory cell)
ct = ft ◦ ct−1 + it ◦ c˜t (Final memory cell)
ht = ot ◦ tanh(ct)
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2.5 Attention Models
The attention model architectures are an alternative neural network models to RNN architec-
tures which utilize an attention mechanism to create a relationship between the input and the
output without relying on sequential distance computation as an RNN model does. According
to Vaswani et al. “self-attention is an attention mechanism that relates unique positions of a
sequence and then computes a representation of this sequence [14]”.
RNN-based and attention based models differ from each other in that attention based models
pass all of the encoder’s hidden states to the decoder whereas RNN-based S2S models only pass
the last hidden state to the decoder. Figure 2.1Alammar visualizes the differences between S2S
models and attention based models [15].
(a) Traditional S2S RNN: Decoder Receives Only The Last Hidden State From Encoder
(b) S2S Attention Model: Decoder Receives All Hidden States From Encoder
Figure 2.1
S2S RNN Model vs S2S Attention Model
2.6 Authentication Layers
In the context of controlling access to computing systems, authentication is a mechanism that
confirms or denies the identity of a user to a system. The canonical means of authenticating is
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by using a simple username and password. In this traditional authentication method, a user will
remain authenticated until they either log out or the system invalidates their log in session based
on a time constraint. Asserting a user’s identity when they enter their log in credentials poses
several challenges when they become compromised. One way to mitigate such a compromise
is to integrate a second factor authentication and or have in session authentication intervals. A
second factor authentication requires the user to provide an additional form of authentication
from table 1.1. An in session authentication interval involves the system to periodically re-
trieve authentication credentials from the user to include password authentication or biometric
authentication.
According to Karim et al, active authentication is a mechanism in which a system requires
in-session authentication over frequent intervals [9]. An example of active authentication is
requiring the user to re-enter their credentials more frequently, but this greatly inconveniences
the user because they would have to stop performing their current task and enter their creden-
tials. Another challenge that active authentication poses is having the user scan their biometric
credential(s) however, this also reduces the user experience as the user has to switch tasks. Fur-
thermore using biometric scanners for active authentication means that the system depends on
external peripheral devices. By using existing peripheral devices such as a keyboard to add
biometric authentication, the overall system requirements are reduced and the user experience
is conserved when providing a second authentication factor or providing an in session authen-
tication.
13
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Cyber Security Risk Management
To take advantage of a high speed low latent gigabit network, we used high performance
network SSH (HPN SSH). HPN SSH is simply a patch to OpenSSH that expands the SSH buffer
sizes; as a result this increases the SSH channel receive buffers throughput [16]. After the GPR
image files were uploaded to the server, they were then processed and rendered by a separate
application server so that city planners may view the underground infrastructure maps using an
augmented reality (AR) mobile device. The underground utility registry and AR maps will be
accessible via a city’s network. This will enable field technicians to view the underground map
and enable smart city researchers and city planners to collaborate with each other by reducing
the time to locate and identify underground infrastructure.
In this section we will present the overall system design. In section, 3.2 threat model, we
discuss system threats and ways to mitigate these threats. Section 3.2.1 describes the potential
attack vectors and how we secured the communication between the client and server to greatly
reduce network attacks. In section 3.3 we discuss the implemented security design that prevents
ormitigates the threats from ourmodel in section 3.2. Since user authenticationwas a significant
component of this research, we have dedicated section 3.4 to the topic, with respect to keystroke
authentication.
3.2 Threat Model
When designing a secure system one must consider not just potential threats to the system
but also how to respond to threats. The NIST Cyber Security Framework shown in figure 1.1
was used to identify which assets needed to be protected as well as responding to threats with
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its respective mitigation method. Table 3.1 shows our approach to responding to or mitigating
cyber threats. The threats considered in our model were categorized into the following Network
Security: User Authentication, Access control, Transport-Level security Wireless and System-
Security: Intruders, Firewall and Malicious software.
Table 3.1
Threat Model and Threat Mitigation
Cyber Threat Mitigation
Eavesdropping Encryption (public-key)
Impersonation Keystroke authentication
Multi-user database Role based access control
Intrusions Intrusion detection system
Brute-force SSH attacks Cryptographic Key-based authentication
SSH backdoors Disable port forwarding
Compromised SSH keys Provisioning policy
Cryptanalysis Enforce strong algorithm suite
Regarding authentication, having a single form of authentication means that an adversary
only has to bypass this single form of authentication to gain access on behalf of a legitimate
user. Adding a second form of authentication increases the security of a system but also adds a
layer of complexity and may also inconvenience the end user.
3.2.1 Network Security
Wireless 802.11 communication is inherently insecure due to an access point (AP) broadcast-
ing a networkwhich can be interfered (jamming) with and due to the pre-shared key (PSK) being
susceptible to brute force attacks [17]. Furthermore, the attack surface on wireless networks is
more vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. SSH and transport layer security (TLS)
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both provide a secure and encrypted connection between a client-server system and can be used
to defeat MITM attacks.
Our security model required preventing MITM attacks and mitigating the risk of exposing
the data confidentiality of such an attack. One way to ensure the data confidentiality require-
ments for data in transit is to have data transmission be over an encrypted communication chan-
nel between the client and server. For the communication, we prioritized security as we needed
a form of user authentication before the transport is initialized. We used the SSH protocol for
uploading the field scan data between the client and server as it provides: a secure transport,
user authentication to use the private key and a connection protocol [18]. The main differences
between TLS and SSH is that TLS does not (by default) provide client authentication whereas
with SSH, a client must be authenticated for the communication session to be initiated. In other
words you can initiate a TLS session without having to authenticate to the server whereas with
SSH a client must be authenticated before the SSH session is created.
The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) currently recommends the security algorithm
suite for protecting national security systems, see table 3.2. Our SSH enforced security algo-
rithm suite negotiates the following: RSA 4096-bit size key, cipher algorithms aes256-cbc,
aes256-ctr; key exchange algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp384 and message authentication code
(MACs) hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512.
To increase the SSH uploading throughput speed from the client to the server, we utilized
High Performance Networking (HPN) SSH. HPN SSH is software source code patch to the
standard SSH code-base and enables the SSH server to leverage the Linux kernel’s automatic
TCP tuning feature. Note that this TCP auto-tuning feature is enabled by default on more recent
Linux Kernels (after 2.6.6 and 2.4.16) [16]. Table 3.3 demonstrates wireless upload speeds on a
patched HPN SSH server. Note that typical wireless upload speeds using an unpatched (HPN)
SSH on an Intel 8260 wireless interface are approximately 12.5 MB/sec.
As a first scenario, the web server is on the Internet and any consumer can communicate
with the web server via a communication channel R. In the second scenario, the web server is
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Table 3.2
NSA’s 2016 Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite [1]
Algorithm Usage
RSA 3072-bit or larger Key establishment, digital signature
Diffie-Hellman 3072-bit or larger ECDHE
ECDH with NIST P-384 Key establishment
ECDSAwith NIST P-384 Digital Signature
SHA-384 Integrity
AES-256 Confidentiality
Table 3.3
Wireless Transfer Speeds Using HPN SSH
Client Wireless Interface File Size (GB) Upload Speed
Avg.(MB/sec)
Upload Time (sec)
Intel 8260 1.95 41.76 44
Intel 3165 2.89 22.57 121
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on a private internal network S. Note that we also assume that for both scenarios the traffic is
encrypted.
In the first scenario in which the web server is accessible via Internet. An attacker could
eavesdrop on the network traffic from client to the server (man-in-the-middle attack) and capture
any plain-text network traffic. This type of attack can occur at the DNS level or Internet provider
level.
Considering the second scenario in which the webserver is on a private network, the at-
tacker can intercept the network traffic to and from the client. This type of attack would also be
a man-in-the-middle attack via the name server on the private network so the malicious actor
could potentially be a rogue network administrator. Therefore, it is important to protect com-
munications against man-in-the-middle attacks via the DNS or the Internet service provider.
Encrypted communication necessary for high targeted web sites and networked CI systems.
As an example, Table 3.4 shows a list of high profile web applications and the cipher suite that
they use to secure the communication with browser clients. A site’s cipher suite is publicly
available and can be shown by simply visiting the website and clicking on the lock icon located
on the upper left hand side of the site url. Figure 3.1 shows the cipher suite used in our GPR
website whereas table 3.4 shows the cipher suites used by several important government and
corporate domains.
Detecting network threats was accomplished by using an intrusion detection system (IDS)
named Suricata. Suricata is a signature based IDS, meaning that it looks network packet patterns
and compares them to a known malicious packet patterns.
3.3 Security Design
The basis of every computing system consists of an operating system and its kernel, which
is a program that controls the operating system. The kernel is responsible for memory manage-
ment,interfacing applications to the computer hardware, and enforcing enabled security policies
for users. First we will describe the operating system (OS) and basic configurations that should
be set up before exposing a server to the Internet. The OS chosen for the server was GNU/Linux.
18
Table 3.4
Cipher Suites Used by Important Domains
Domain name KE &Authentication Cipher & Message Auth
mail.google.com ECDHE ECDSA AES 128 SHA256
nsa.gov ECDHE RSA AES 256 SHA384
chase.com ECDHE RSA AES 128 SHA256
paypal.com ECDHE RSA AES 128 SHA256
washingtonpost.com ECDHE RSA AES 256 SHA384
apple.com ECDHE RSA AES 256 SHA384
Figure 3.1
The Cipher Suite Used on the US Ignite GPR Domain
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The entire file system is encrypted with Linux Unified Key Setup 1 (LUKS1) type and is using
an advanced encryption standard 256-bit (AES) cipher. OS kernel security modules enforce
access control security policies to specific system resources such as network interfaces. This
happens in kernel space and thus only admin users can configure the profile for an OS kernel
security module. OS kernel security modules are capable of configuring a process to not have
access to networking resources as well as other resources. Apparmor and Security Enhanced
Linux (SELinux) are both Linux kernel security modules that are used to enforce security poli-
cies and thus enhance the system’s security. In our system, we usedApparmor to enforce access
to networking resources. For example, the following applications had access to networking re-
sources: Apache, MySQL, Mongo DB, PHP, SSH and Suricata.
The following is a list of our security design requirements: file system encryption, strong
authentication, role based access control and preventing information disclosure in networked
communications. In designing the web server, we considered providing multiple users with the
ability to log on and view the GPR scans. We used recent versions of Apache2, PHP, MySQL
andMongoDBwith grid filesystem (GridFS) as the database engines to store user authentication
and GPR data respectively.
Some system requirements were to securely upload data collected from a ground penetrating
radar system to a remote server and then use system level programming to move the GPR data
to MongoDB’s GridFS. GridFS allows us to store files that are larger than 16Mb, and it does
this by splitting file chunks across the GridFS. An advantage of splitting up the files as such is
that the GridFS does not have a limit on the number of files to be stored in a directory; you can
read sections of a large file without having to load the entire file into memory [19].
Protecting against 802.11 wireless access attacks such as malicious associations or other
MITM attacks via the AP was also considered. Countering malicious associations was accom-
plished by configuring the AP to use WPA2 with a pre-shared key (PSK), this method encrypts
the communication between the GPR client and the AP and also to certain extent prevent mali-
cious associations, provided that an attacker does not know the PSK. If an attacker does know
the PSK and then sets up a rogueAP to act as the legitimateAP and attempts to eavesdrop on the
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Figure 3.2
An Overview of the GPR Network
client-server communication then a second layer of encryption at the transport layer can miti-
gate the attacker from eavesdropping on the communication between the AP and the client. All
of our end-to-end networked communication was encrypted using TLS 1.2 for http access and
SSH for remote system management and file uploads. Figure 3.2 demonstrates starting from
the bottom left-hand side,the GPR client uploads GPR data to the server so an AR device may
view a 3D underground infrastructure map; bottom right: a city planner can also log on to the
secure system and view underground infrastructure maps
3.4 Keystroke Dynamics &Authentication
The overall authentication system was broken down into two components. First, there is sys-
tem level authentication in which a user can remotely administer the services running on the
system. The second component includes: authenticating to the services running on the system
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such as the AR application server and the city planning server that contain the underground
infrastructure maps. A strong authentication system should minimize risk of a user impersonat-
ing as a legitimate user. For remote system level authentication, the system only accepts SSH
key-based authentication with a key pass-phrase. This accomplishes two things: it eliminates
brute force attacks and ensures that only an authorized user is logging on to the system since
they need to posses the private key and know the key pass-phrase. We provided a strong form
of second factor authentication to the web services. First, the user’s keystroke behavior were
collected, analyzed and then utilized as a second form of active authentication for their session.
As a user types on a keyboard, with each keystroke sequence, the keystroke time duration
such as key-press and key-release can be collected for each key. It is these keystroke timing
events that are the essential keystroke features necessary to create a model for a user’s typing
behavior. These features are known as the down-up (DU) time, up-down (UD) time and down-
down (DD) time. DU is the time between pressing a key and releasing the next key, UD is the
time between releasing one key and pressing the next key and DD is the time between pressing
one key and pressing the next key. Figure 3.3 illustrates the three features DU, DD and UD that
were collected in between each keystroke.
Figure 3.3
The Common Keystroke Features DU, DD and UD
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3.5 Keystroke Biometric Process
One of the first steps in using biometrics is to create a biometric template for a user and then
use this template to enroll the user into a biometric database. Before enrolling a user’s keystroke
typing behavior we must first create a biometric template for their keystroke behavior. One can
either have create a keystroke template when they register with their username and password or
by having each user type out the same series of sentences after they register. After capturing the
keystroke features, the user’s keystroke are trained to create a unique model for each user. This
keystroke model will be used to provide a form of active authentication as the user performs
their usual typing activities on the system during their session.
After the user’s keystrokes are collected, the system pre-processes the keystroke data to
prepare it for feature analysis (training). Each user’s keystroke dataset is then trained against
all of the other user’s keystroke typing data. The frequency at which the system is re-trained
was not considered meaning that we did not consider to retrain the system as the number of
users increases; we trained the system in one large batch.
According to [14], competitive neural network sequence transductionmodels have an encoder-
decoder structure which motivated our interest in integrating a transduction model into our sys-
tem.
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Figure 3.4
The Web-based Biometric Process Used In Our System
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
4.1 Biometric Keystroke Model Evaluation
The results obtained used the Carnegie Mellon University’s (CMUs) opensource keystroke
dataset. The CMU data set consisted of 51 subjects typing the same password 400 times. The
training and testing were also implemented in a machine learning blog [20] and are as follow:
• Training data - First 200 samples (per user)
• Testing data - Remaining 200 samples
• Testing impostor data - 5 samples from remaining 50 users (250 samples)
To evaluate the performance of the models used to detect an impostor’s keystrokes, the equal
error rate (EER) was used. EER is the rate at which the false acceptance rate and the false
rejection rate are equal. Table 4.1 shows the EER for the models that we considered and figure
4.1 shows the respective model’s corresponding accuracy. The best performing model was
the Manhattan Scaled with an EER of 0.118 having a corresponding 88.2 percent accuracy.
An 88.2 percent accuracy means that 11.8 percent of the time another user would succeed in
impersonating another user’s keystroke typing behavior. It for this reason, keystroke biometrics
should not be used as the only authentication factor.
4.2 Risk Management Formulation
In [21] the authors define a risk equation as:
CyberRisk(R) = Threat(T ) ∗ V ulnerability(V ) ∗ Consequence(C) (4.1)
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Table 4.1
Initial Models Used to Measure User Biometric Keystroke Accuracy
Model EER
Manhattan Distance 0.181
Manhattan Filtered 0.148
Manhattan Scaled 0.118
One Class SVM 0.121
GMM 0.129
Figure 4.1
Model Accuracy of The Used Models
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We use equation 4.1 to quantify the cyber risk by first making two worst case assumptions for
V andC. In our risk model, we used MITRE’s CWE for architectural concepts to formulate our
units for R, T ,V ,and C. For the consequence unit (C) we considered the scope of what needed
to be protected such as the confidentiality and integrity of the data being transmitted. As an ex-
ample of a vulnerability having a high consequence, let us consider the consequences of using
a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm in our communication [22]. The consequences of us-
ing such a cryptographic algorithm would jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity and sender’s
identity of the transmitted data. In the risk equation’s units, the higher the magnitude of the
unit value the greater the: threat, vulnerability and consequence are. Next we consider three
different threat actors, a state actor, a black hat and the general public as an attacker with each
threat factor ranging from: 1e−1 T to 3 T. Table 4.2 shows the latter configuration of V and C
with T varying. The goal is to minimize R. Formulating a metric value for T would consist of
how probable a threat is to the system. In our model, the lowest theoretical value for Risk is
3e−3 R. It is safe to assume a maximum threat value for T when considering a state actor as they
will always have the resources and the capacity to carry out attacks on critical systems.
Table 4.2
The Values for R,T,V and C in the Risk Equation
Cyber Risk(R) Threat(T) Vulnerability(V) Consequence(C)
27 State Actor = 3 3 3
18 Black Hat = 2 3 3
4.5 Gen. Public = 0.5 3 3
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSIONAND CONCLUSION
5.1 Objectives of the Study
In summary, our objectives were to develop a stand alone web-based biometric keystroke
authentication system, provide an encrypted high throughput data channel, and use a well es-
tablished cyber security framework to manage cyber risks.
5.2 Keystroke Authentication in Critical Infrastructure Systems
Modern societies heavily rely on infrastructure to perform their daily functions. Clean drink-
ing water and other common utilities enable societies to accomplish their daily task such as
operating computers, powering heating and cooling systems, etc. Smart grids aim to improve
the quality of the infrastructure but also introduce a potential cyber threat into the overall system.
Web-based application services can be integrated into a smart city grid to: facilitate city
planning, forecast traffic patterns and create a mapping of underground infrastructure. Access-
ing critical information such as: personal data, bank accounts, personal health information and
manage critical infrastructure systems may be accessible via mobile devices. Securing such
critical systems against cyber threats is essential to the public safety and poses many challenges
as there are many interdependent components in any computing system.
It is estimated that by the year 2020, 30 billion devices will be connected to the Internet [23].
Heterogeneous interconnected sensory systems are being integrated into other systems for the
purpose of storing and analyzing the data that they collect. For example, autonomous vehicle
to vehicle communication systems and other smart city systems will need to use a high speed
low-latency network to support the bandwidth needed to transmit sensor data. This new genera-
tion of information systems is currently being researched for the purpose of integrating sensory
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networks and wireless networks into city infrastructure such as cameras, weather sensors and
radar into: traffic control systems, vehicle to vehicle communication systems and critical infras-
tructure mapping systems. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines critical
infrastructure (CI) as “the backbone of our nation’s economy, security, and health”. DHS cate-
gorizes water and waste water systems as one of the critical infrastructure sectors. Underground
utilities are categorized as critical infrastructure (CI). They carry drinking water, storm water,
sewage, natural gas, electric power, telecommunications, etc. This infrastructure reflects a city’s
growth and history with many components aging in unknown locations with congested config-
urations and in unknown conditions. According to former Washington D.C. water and sewer
CEO George S. Hawkins, a pipe breaks on an average of once a day in D.C. [24]. Figure 5.1
shows our AR application using a GPR image to map out an underground sewer pipe. Figure
5.2 demonstrates how machine learning techniques can be used on GPR images to detect defor-
mations in a sports track; the same techniques may be applied to detect deformations in other
subsurface objects. The concept of using machine learning methods on GPR images can be used
to create an underground infrastructure map and also precisely locate damaged underground in-
frastructure without having to excessively trench to find the damaged pipes. An underground
pipe leak or damaging a pipe can cost many financial resources to a city and delay construction
deadlines, see Figure 5.3.
5.3 Summary of the Findings
Our findings demonstrated that keystroke biometrics can be used to increase the security
of the system by mitigating the use of a compromised password. The equal error rates were
computed using five different models from table 4.1. The best performing model was the Man-
hattan Scaled which had an ERR of 0.118. Based on our literature review, attention based neural
network models have proven to be efficient models for sequence to sequence (s2s) analysis.
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Figure 5.1
Using a GPR Image to Detect Underground Utility Pipe Location
Figure 5.2
Using a GPR image to Detect Deformations in Subsurface Objects
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Figure 5.3
Water Leak With Excess Trenching Required to Determine Location
5.4 Conclusions
User authentication plays a major role in providing access to resource and it is an essential
security layer for all systems. The more authentication factors a system has, the more difficult
it is to by-pass the authentication or impersonate a legitimate user. In our research, biometric
keystroke authentication detected a non-legitimate user 88.2 percent of the time solely based on
their keystroke typing behavior. This research also explored designing and developing a secure
smart city infrastructure system, by including cyber risk management and utilizing the NIST
Cyber Security Framework as our risk management model.
5.5 Recommendations for Further Study
This research also initiated the development of attention based neural networks but due to the
research’s time constraints the full model was not able to be fully implemented. As a recom-
mendation for future research, a full integration the attention based neural network (NN) model
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into system would be of great value to this research. As a final area of future contribution to
this research, expanding upon the evaluation of cyber risks would add to this research.
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